Someone, presumably not psyched abou the handling of the war, leaks a letter from Sanchez to the Post:

Sanchez, who was the senior commander on the ground in Iraq from the summer of 2003 until the summer of 2004, said in his letter that Army units in Iraq were "struggling just to maintain . . . relatively low readiness rates" on key combat systems, such as M-1 Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, anti-mortar radars and Black Hawk helicopters. He also said units were waiting an average of 40 days for critical spare parts, which he noted was almost three times the Army's average. In some Army supply depots in Iraq, 40 percent of critical parts were at "zero balance," meaning they were absent from depot shelves, he said. He also protested in his letter, sent Dec. 4 to the number two officer in the Army, with copies to other senior officials, that his soldiers still needed protective inserts to upgrade 36,000 sets of body armor but that their delivery had been postponed twice in the month before he was writing. There were 131,000 U.S. troops in Iraq at the time. In what appears to be a plea to top officials to spur the bureaucracy to respond more quickly, Sanchez concluded, "I cannot sustain readiness without Army-level intervention."

As Matt Yglesias observes:

This was as of December 2003, so while "senior Army officials" may say "that most of Sanchez's concerns have been addressed in recent months" one has to ask oneself why most of them weren't addressed a long time ago and how it is that some of them still haven't been addressed today. It would also be nice to know which concerns, exactly, are the ones they haven't gotten around to addressing.